


John Locke's Liberalism ( Chicago: Chicago University Press 1987). The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism ( Oxford: Oxford University Press 1962) Google Scholar Grant, Ruth W. ed., John Locke: Problems and Perspectives ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1969) 19– 33 Google Scholar MacPherson, C.B. eds., Philosophy and the Civilizing Arts ( Athens, OH: Ohio University Press 1974) 126–65 Google Scholar Seliger, Martin ‘ Locke, Liberalism, and Nationalism,’ in Yolton, John W. For a range of interpretations of Locke's defense as an error of philosophical judgment arising from either racist or bourgeois socialization see Popkin, Richard ‘ Philosophical Bases of Modem Racism,’ in Walton, Craig and Alton, John P. Want of a common judge with authority, puts all men in a state of nature: force without right, upon a man’s person, makes a state of war, both where there is, and is not, a common judge.3 For an overview of recent interpretations of Locke's defense of slavery, see Glausser, Wayne ‘ Three Approaches to Locke and the Slave Trade,’ Journal of the History of Ideas 51 ( 1990) 99– 216 CrossRef Google Scholar. Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill, when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat because the law, which was made for my preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure my life from present force, which, if lost, is capable of no reparation, permits me my own defence, and the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law, for remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable.


But force, or a declared design of force, upon the person of another, where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war: and it is the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an aggressor, tho’ he be in society and a fellow subject.
